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Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. Certainly in the past it
was somewhat intimidated by Congress into its passivity, 2 ' but it is not
too much to say that the time has come for the FCC
to show some intestinal fortitude and protect the linchpin of any demo-
cratic society from private domination by insuring a free, competitive,
and independent multitude of voices in the communications industry.' 2'
Furthermore, should the FCC not accept this responsibility, the Congress
should formally amend the Communications Act thereby directing the
Commission to dispose of licenses in light of the antitrust laws and de-
cisions. Many may retort that the expense of such inquiries will be too
great, but the reply must be that the cost cannot be too great if it insures
the freedom of the press.
WILLIAM H. LEWIS, JR.
An Analysis of the Enforceability of Marital Contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment will analyze the treatment of marital contracts by the
North Carolina courts. The focus is upon contracts in the context of a
marriage rather than upon either contracts or domestic relations alone.
A broader question, however, is posed: Is the law of contracts the most
meaningful method available for the analysis and expression of public
policy concerning marital contracts?
A recent example of the judicial approach to marital contracts is found
in Matthews v. Matthews.' The issue was the enforceability of an alleged
marital contract entered into after twelve years of marriage. Fourteen
years after the date of the purported contract an absolute divorce had
been entered, and the plaintiff-husband had petitioned for a sale and parti-
tion of lands that he and his defendant-wife had held as tenants in common.
She produced the alleged contract signed by plaintiff in which plaintiff
120 In the early 1950's, Congress considered amending the Communications Act
to prohibit discrimination against newspapers when considering applications for
broadcast licenses. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 2326, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. (1952).
Fortunately, no such law was ever enacted.
2' Flynn, Antitrust and the Newspapers: A Comment on S. 1312, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 103, 125 (1968). See generally Johnson, The Media Barons and the Public
Interest, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1968, at 43.
'2 N.C. App. 143, 162 S.E.2d 697 (1968).
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had declared "that if I ever leave Edith . . . everything I have or will
have will be hers to have and hold for the benefit of our children and
herself-I make no claim on anything we own jointly, and separately."-
The court decided that the alleged contract was not enforceable in view
of three traditional "tests"' for the existence of a contract-consideration,
clarity, and public policy. Although concluding that the alleged promise
of the plaintiff was without consideration and was vague and indefinite,
the court held that even if the "tests" of consideration and clarity were
met, the promise was "looking to a future separation, and would be in the
nature of a property settlement or separation agreement. Articles or
deeds of separation are permissible where the separation has already taken
place or immediately follows: but agreements looking to a future separa-
tion of husband and wife will not be sustained."4 The court explained that
the central position of the home in the welfare of the community necessi-
tates its perpetuation. If agreements such as the one alleged were en-
forced, disunity would be promoted because one spouse would be induced
to make life miserable for the other, thus forcing effectuation of the agree-
ment and stripping the other spouse of all property rights.'
Initially, care must be taken to distinguish marriage as a contractual
relationship from marital contracts themselves. The marriage contract is
the marriage itself with the rights and duties incident to that relation-
ship; whereas, the marital contract is a contractual obligation between
husband and wife that may bear upon the marital relationship but which
is not the marriage itself. The idea that marriage is a civil contract has
been traced to Blackstone insofar as the idea has affected American law.'
Blackstone attributed common law notions of marriage to ecclesiastical
and civil laws and said of marriage that
the law treats it as it does all other contracts: allowing it to be good
and valid in all cases, where the parties at the time of making it were,
in the first place, willing to contract; secondly, able to contract; and
lastly, actually did contract, in the proper forms and solemnities re-
quired by law.7
Even the common law did not recognize marriage as a true contract, how-
ever, because after marriage the parties could not enter valid contracts
2 Id. at 145, 162 S.E.2d at 698.
3 See Id. at 147, 162 S.E.2d at 699. "Tests" is the term used by the court.
'Id.
SId.
'1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 1, at 5 (3d ed. 1963).
'J. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 78 (1959).
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between themselves.' This disability was attributable to the common law
fiction of the unity of the husband and wife and to the theory that the
husband, as the dominating member of the household, was able to exercise
a coercive influence upon his wife.' A further limitation upon marriage
as a pure contract was found in those jurisdictions such as North Caro-
lina"0 that do not recognize a "common law" (informal or non-ceremonial)
marriage. North Carolina recognizes the necessity for expressed consent,
but requires the presence of an officer or ordained minister for a marriage
to be valid. 1 It is therefore apparent that the common law marriage
was not an ordinary contract such as is found in a commercial setting.
The consequences of the common law notion that marriage is a con-
tract have been modified by statutory enactments. The disabilities attach-
ing at common law to the contracts between spouses 12 have been alleviated
to a great extent.'3 Contracts between husband and wife that are neither
subject to statutory limitations nor prohibibted by public policy are ex-
pressly declared valid. 4 But statutory conditions attach to certain trans-
actions between spouses affecting the wife's real property or income
accrued therefrom for more than three years. Such transactions are void
unless there is a private examination of the wife by the officer certifying
the acknowledgment" to ascertain that the contract is not "unreasonable
or injurious to the wife.""' Thus the statutory scheme abolishes the com-
mon law fiction of the unity of husband and wife but recognizes the
possibility that a husband may exercise an undesirable coercive influence
upon his wife. Subject to the above limitation and the rights of the
surviving spouse to an elective life estate,17 every married person is given
by statute general authority to deal with his property, real and personal, as
'2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 107 (3d ed. 1963).
0Id.
" Fields v. Hollowell, 238 N.C. 614, 78 S.E.2d 740 (1953) (no recovery by
common law wife under workman's compensation statute for death of common law
husband); State v. Wilson, 121 N.C. 650, 28 S.E. 416 (1897).
" State v. Wilson, 121 N.C. 650, 28 S.E. 416 (1897) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1
(1966).
122 R. LEE, supra note 8, § 107.
'8See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-12 to -12 (1966) (Powers and Liabilities of
Married Persons).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1966).
"Bolin v. Bolin, 246 N.C. 666, 99 S.E.2d 920 (1957) (separation contract);
Davis v. Vaughn, 243 N.C. 486, 91 S.E.2d 165 (1955) (indirect conveyance to
husband by deed to third party).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6(b) (1966).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-7 (1966).
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if unmarried.' 8 This grant of authority presumably includes the power to
contract with the spouse concerning property.
The statutes provide that a separation agreement of a married couple,
both of whom are at least eighteen years of age, shall bind the parties as
if they were of age if the contract is acknowledged before a superior court
clerk with a private examination of the wife.'" The necessity of this addi-
tion to the general provisions validating marital contracts has its source
in contract theory. The law of contracts has given minors the power to
disaffirm that which would otherwise be a binding duty arising from a
contract.2 0 The weight of a statute is added to a separation agreement
in a prescribed form between the minors to eliminate the power to dis-
affirm which the minor would otherwise possess and to clarify the binding
nature of the contract. This statutory analysis suggests the difficulty of
dealing with marriage contracts in a manner consistent with traditional
contractual principles. This difficulty becomes clearer if the concept that
marriage itself is a contract is logically extended. If marriage were a true
contract, then minors should be able to disaffirm at will before reaching
majority. Yet, except to the extent permitted by divorce and annulment
statutes, minors have no power to disaffirm the marriage.2'
Thus, it has been said that
[t]he only element of a contract which marriage has is the consent of
the parties. The law does not give to persons the complete freedom of
control over their marriage which they are given over their ordinary
contracts. Individuals have a free choice as to whether they will marry
or not, but if they do marry, the state immediately becomes a party
vitally interested in the new status which their marriage has created,
and will not permit them, by agreement to modify or revoke the terms
which the law attaches to their status, without the state's consent.
22
The North Carolina court has stated that it will treat marriage as a con-
tract only insofar as the consent of both parties must precede it.28 Once
the marriage exists it loses its identity as a contract and becomes a
"relation" or "institution" affecting not only the parties but also society
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1966).
"9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1966).
o S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS 269 (rev. ed. 1938) [here-
inafter cited as WILLISTON].2 Id.
22 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, at 3-4.
2 State v. Hairston, 63 N.C. 451, 453 (1869).
[Vol. 47
MARITAL CONTRACTS
in general. 24 Marriage has been said to create a new status,25 and the
movement from the treatment of marriage as contract to the treatment of
mirrage as a status poses questions concerning the future of marital con-
tracts. Since courts refuse to analyze marriage in contractual terms, the
status of the parties to a marital contract should influence the manner
in which courts interpret such contracts.28
The practicing lawyer needs to be able to predict what the courts will
find to be an enforceable marital contract.2 7 Such predictability is crucial
not only because of the potential effect of the particular contract on the sta-
bility of the marital relations, but also because of various other legal rela-
tionships affected by the validity of marital contracts. Tax consequences
are obviously important considerations. One frequently recurring prob-
lem, for example, is the taxation of alimony payments to the husband or
wife depending upon the terms and validity of a separation contract.,8
Another concern is the rights of creditors and other third parties. Marital
contracts to defraud third persons are contrary to public policy and will
not be enforced.2 9 Finally, in the interpretation of marital contracts,
courts always will be mindful of the welfare of the children. 30 They may
be "third party beneficiaries" of interspousal contracts directly or by
implication. 1
II. THE PREDICTIVE FACTORS
To help predict the types of marital contracts that courts will en-
force, one must be aware of three recurring concepts in North Carolina
case law. First, the influence of the statutes upon the powers of married
persons to contract concerning their property is overriding. But, as will
be discussed, the courts through a process of "inclusion and exclusion"
have required the statutory safeguards for some transactions and not for
others. Second, to determine whether a marital contract will be upheld
one should examine the bargain factors inducing the marital contract.
Bargain factors connote circumstances that "free traders" consider in
2 4 
Id.
" See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1944).
" An example of a similar inquiry outside the marital context is the scrutiny
given contracts arising from the fiduciary relationship between a trustee and cestui
que trust.
"See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
" See INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 71.
" 17 Am. JuR. 2d Contracts § 185 (1964).
, See M. ERNST & D. LoTHr, FOR BETTER OR WORSE 222-223 (1952).
'1 Note, Rights of Enforcement in Third Party Beneficiary, 19 N.C.L. REv. 384
(1941).
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determining whether a particular contract is advantageous or purposeful.
One should analyze the transaction to ascertain whether the contract is the
result of genuine bargain factors or, contrariwise, the result of the
marriage itself without reference to bargain factors. If the former, then
the contract should be honored if upon analysis a somewhat comparable
contract in a non-marital setting would be enforced. If the latter, then
because of the relationship or status of the parties, the contract should
be suspect, and courts should impose statutory safeguards. In the latter
event courts generally will be applying the language of bargain to an
essentially non-bargain situation. There are several reasons for the minor
importance of bargain factors in this context. "The semi-gift nature of
the transaction softens the outlines of the bargain .... The evidence of
the terms is often unsatisfactory. The persons interested may not have
been parties to the bargain and may bear other relations to the parties that
cannot be ignored. '32 Third, courts occasionally rely expressly upon public
policy for their decisions, in spite of conclusions to which they otherwise
may be led by applying contractual concepts. 3 The tendency is rationalized
by the role of the courts as the ultimate arbiter of family relations, with the
aim of protecting the legitimate interest of the state in the welfare of the
family.34
Using these concepts most North Carolina cases dealing with marital
contracts may be reconciled. Attention will be focused first upon the
principal problem areas in marital contracts-antenuptial, postmarital
and separation-to illustrate how the courts use contractual concepts to
reach usually acceptable results. Attention then will be directed to the
unique area of marital contracts to raise children in a particular religion,
the validity of which is not only analyzed but also expressed chiefly in
terms of public policy rather than contractual concepts.
A. Antenuptial Contracts
Antenuptial contracts are frequently employed by those facing marriage
and owning a considerable amount of property. Often the contemplated
marriage is a second marriage for one or both, and there are children by
a previous marriage. To protect against opportunists or to provide for his
"See Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in
Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386, 405 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Havig-
hurst].
" See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 162 S.E.2d 697 (1968).
"See M. ERNST & D. LOTH, supra note 30, at 216.
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children, one may enter into a contract before marriage to regulate the
subsequent rights of the spouses.35 Consideration for the promise of one
to forego certain rights may be in a variety of forms. Sufficient considera-
tion has been found in mutual stipulations for the release of marital
property rights otherwise possessed by each in the realty of the other.38
Such contracts concerning property rights have been held not to violate
public policy" and are generally enforceable according to their terms.38
But such contracts are not without limitations. Courts will not enforce
them unless "entirely satisfied" that the contracts were in fact made,8 9
so that a party seeking to establish a marital contract has a burden of
proof impliedly greater than proof sufficient to establish other contracts.
Further, the language of the contract is scrutinized to ascertain that the
intent is unequivocal if the power of the wife over property to be acquired
in the future is restricted.4 ° Antenuptial agreements have been declared
void because contrary to public policy where the husband sought to relieve
himself of his duty to support his wife4' and where the agreement was
to separate after marriage and obtain a divorce.42 But the wife can agree
to accept a share equal to that of an heir of her husband in lieu of her
dower interest.43 The execution of a bond by which the husband binds
himself to give certain property to his future spouse becomes a lien upon
his property.44 As with other marriage settlements, however, it must be
recorded to have priority over creditors.45
The above rules relate to bilateral contracts, contracts in which one
promise is consideration for another promise.4" A marital contract may be
unilateral, however. It long has been recognized that marriage is sufficient
consideration to support a promise and that a promise to marry is also
sufficient consideration for another promise.47 The impact of the latter
principle, however, has been vitiated in jurisdictions that have abolished
8r See F. KUCHLER, LAW OF ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE 39 (1966).
" Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 89 S.E.2d 245 (1955).
87Id.
Stewart v. Stewart, 222 N.C. 387, 23 S.E.2d 306 (1942).
Montgomery v. Henderson, 56 N.C. 113 (1856).
40 Dunlap v. Hill, 145 N.C. 312, 59 S.E. 112 (1907).
"Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961).
'McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122, 74 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
"Brooks v. Austin, 95 N.C. 474 (1886).
"Freeman v. Hill, 21 N.C. 389 (1836).
" Latham v. Bowen, 52 N.C. 337 (1860).
"'WiLisToN at § 13.
11Id. at § 110.
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the once-common action for breach of contract to marry.48 Having re-
garded marriage as valuable consideration, one still must inquire about
the nature of the consideration in certain instances. Illustrative of the
problem is Whitley v. Whitley,49 a case not easily forgotten by those who
have perused its facts. Plaintiff-husband brought an action on grounds of
fraud to cancel a deed given defendant-wife. The defense was that mar-
riage was valuable consideration for the deed and that no fraud was in-
volved. Plaintiff described the circumstances pursuant to the agreement
as follows:
We had a marriage contract, which was not in writing. She agreed to
marry me if I would give her the tract of land described in the deed,
and I told her that I would give her the land if she would marry me
and take care of me as long as she lived, or as long as I lived. We were
in the cow shed. She was milking, and we shook hands across the cow's
back: I gave her the land, and we were married the next day ....
She lived with me six or seven months, and then left my home ....
I had a conversation with her the day she left. I told her that I had
an uncle who lived ... until he was 105 years of age .... I told her
that I believed I was going to live that long. When I said that she came
up and struck me in the eye .... She left my house and has never
been back or spoken to me since."0
With facts of this nature the problem of determining when consideration
is given becomes crucial. If consideration is given once and for all at
the time of the marriage no rescission should be allowed, absent fraud.
But if defendant's promise to care for plaintiff so long as he lived in-
volved her continuing peformance then there was a failure of considera-
tion on her behalf. The view taken of the nature of the consideration
thus may become determinative of the case. The court in Whitley held
for defendant-wife without inquiring into the nature of the considera-
tion other than to find that the voluntary deed was executed for a valuable
consideration, marriage. Defendant's promise was said to be a condition
subsequent at most, not affecting the validity of the deed even if wrong-
fully breached.
Courts have examined this problem of when consideration passes in an
48 See F. KUCELER, supra note 35, at 34-35. North Carolina is among the states
that have not abolished actions for breach of promise to marry. 1 R. LEE, sapra
note 6, § 3.
'8209 N.C. 25, 182 S.E. 658 (1935), noted in 14 N.C.L. REV. 277 (1936).o!d. at'25-26, 182 S.E. at 658.
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antenuptial contract and have reached varying results." Some have con-
cluded that the general rule is that marital contracts will be enforced in
spite of one party's having breached its terms because the agreements
affect the rights of the children of the marriage as well as the parties.52
This suggests that "performance of the ceremony constitutes complete
performance. ' 5 3 Upon analysis of the facts, however, the doctrine of
consideration fails as a meaningful test of whether an obligation will be
enforced. The courts look not only to acts that may be labeled considera-
tion but also to the conduct of the party seeking to enforce the agree-
ment in terms of the severity of the breach.54 Instead of relying upon
the ordinary dictates of consideration, courts tend to reach results deter-
mined by the degree to which the parties are blameworthy or by the de-
serving character of the respective claimants.5" Thus, where a wife
abandoned her husband after only three and a half weeks of marriage
because of his constant drunkenness, the Iowa court said that "[t]he
consideration of the instrument is the marriage contract. If it be broken
and violated, the antenuptial contract can not be enforced. It would be
monstrous to hold that a woman could collect an annuity settled upon her
by a contract in contemplation of marriage, when after the marriage, with-
out cause, she utterly refused to live with her husband .... ," Courts also
examine the status of the party actually seeking to enforce the contract,
as where the children who were the "innocent objects of parental solicitude
and care" were permitted to enforce a contract made by a defaulting,
deceased parent.
7
It thus seems that the complete performance versus continuing per-
formance analysis of consideration entails an examination of who is seek-
ing to enforce the contract, of how the plaintiff has conducted himself,
and of who are to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the contract. At times
the result is stated in terms of consideration, but the facts usually disclose
the public policies being promoted-the welfare of the marriage and of
" It has been said that the majority of courts "adopt the view that performance
of the ceremony constitutes complete performance, but there is respectable authority
for the proposition that marriage comprises a continuing obligation, and that mere
performance of the ceremony does not translate an antenuptial contract into a uni-
lateral undertaking ... ." Note, 14 N.C.L. REv. 277, 278-279 (1936).
" Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, 124 Md. 330, 341-42, 92 A. 891, 895 (1914).
" Note, 14 N.C.L. REv. 277; 278 (1936).
" Sidney v. Sidney, 24 Eng. Rep. 1060 (Ch. 1734).
"See Havighurst 401-02.
' York v. Ferner, 59 Iowa 487, 491, 13 N.W. 630, 632 (1882).'
' Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239, 264 (1867).
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the family unit. If the preservation of the family is involved, then the
beneficiaries' rights will be enforced even though derived from the default-
ing party. But the defaulting party's right to enforce the contract will not
be recognized if the equities are not in its favor. Therefore, without up-
setting already-established doctrine, the Whitley case could have been
decided for the plaintiff by following the lead of the Iowa court and by
finding that the consideration for the deed was a continually performed
marriage. The only theoretical problem with this result is the tendency
discussed earlier to treat marriage as a status and not as a contract. For
purposes of analysis, however, the result still should have been in favor
of the plaintiff since an examination of the relative positions of the parties
reveals that no detriment had occurred to the wife except her realization
that she would have the plaintiff for her husband for longer than she
obviously had anticipated. Moreover, no children's interest were in-
volved, and plaintiff had been duped to the extent of the value of the
land deeded to defendant and apparently was not at fault.
Consideration is but one of the tests generally applied to determine
the validity of antenuptial contracts. Of course, both parties must have
contractual capacity or legal competency to contract,58 and terms must not
be ambiguous. 9 Antenuptial contracts are construed to effectuate the
parties' intent existing at the time the agreement was executed, but "are
to be construed liberally so as to secure the protection of those interests
which from the very nature of the instrument it must be presumed were
thereby intended to be secured."60 Although the construction of marital
contracts will be dealt with more fully in the treatment of separation
contracts, one difference between the termination of antenuptial and sep-
aration agreements should be noted. Because of the nature of the relation-
ship contemplated by the parties, separation agreements are voided by
subsequent resumption of marital cohabitation. But antenuptial agree-
ments are not affected by a separation and subsequent reconciliation of the
parties, absent contrary contractual or statutory terms."' There is, how-
ever, great similarity between modification of separation agreements by
consent and the rule that "[a]ntenuptial contracts may during coverture
be modified or rescinded with the full and free consent of the parties
thereto, provided the rights of third parties have not intervened.
0 2
58Cf. Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 89 S.E.2d 245 (1955).
Cf. Stewart v. Stewart, 222 N.C. 387, 23 S.E.2d 306 (1942).oId. at 392, 23 S.E.2d at 309.





Postmarital contracts arise out of a relationship necessarily different
in a legal sense from antenuptial contracts. Marriage is no longer simply
contemplated but is an operative fact fully considered by the court. Gen-
erally courts will scrutinize the terms to satisfy themselves that there is
no overreaching, or that no harsh undertakings are assumed by the wife.
An attorney's problem frequently becomes one of ascertaining in advance
of a court decree which inter-spousal transactions, by affecting or charging
the wife's real estate or real estate income, require compliance with the
previously mentioned statutory safeguard requiring private examination
of the wife.6 3 The problem arises from the informal nature of many
marital agreements, as represented by the Whitley case and the cases that
follow.6" The purpose of the statute is twofold: the prevention of fraud
upon the wife by the husband and the validation of transactions not recog-
nized at all at common law.", The process of "inclusion and exclusion"
is used to include certain transactions within, and exclude others from,
the statutory requirements according to the policy underlying the statute.
The North Carolina court has required the private questioning of the
wife in certain transactions that share common non-bargain elements.
Thus, deeds by husband and wife of entirety property to a trustee for the
husband's benefit, 6 and a conveyance to a third party by the wife with a
subsequent conveyance by the third party to the spouses as tenants by the
entirety 7 have been held to require the statutory safeguard. Once the
estate of the wife loses its characterization as real estate or income accrued
therefrom, however, the personalty may be disposed of by the wife as her
separate property.6 8 Further, the statute does not apply to contracts be-
tween the husband and wife as an entity and a third party, loans to the
husband for which security is taken,70 and agreements guaranteeing pay-
ment of the husband's obligation.7' Analyzed in terms of the existence of
bargain factors, it seems that the absence of such factors in the cases
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1966).
'In agreements drafted by an attorney the question should not often arise
because the attorney should comply with the statute in borderline cases.
"Stout v. Perry, 152 N.C. 312, 67 S.E. 757 (1910).
"See Ingram v. Easley, 227 N.C. 442, 42 S.E.2d 624 (1947); Best v. Utley, 189
N.C. 356, 127 S.E. 337 (1925).
"Brinson v. Kirby, 251 N.C. 73, 110 S.E.2d 482 (1959).
"Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960).
"Jackson v. Beard, 162 N.C. 105, 78 S.E. 6 (1913).
'o Rencher v. Wynne, 86 N.C. 268 (1882).
"Arcady Farms Milling Co. v. Wallace, 242 N.C. 686, 89 S.E.2d 413 (1955).
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
involving entireties property, and the presence of them in more com-
mercially oriented transactions (e.g., loan and guaranty), generally explain
the result reached by the court in applying the protective statute. Con-
tracts held to be included within the terms of the statute cannot be oral,72
although those contracts "excluded" may be oral if not violative of the
Statute of Frauds. Therefore, if the interest of the wife that is affected
by an oral agreement is her real estate or income therefrom, the trans-
action will require the private examination and will be subject to the
Statute of Frauds, either of which eliminates the possibility of an oral
agreement. Since the protective statute applies only to the wife's interest
in realty, its terms, if not its policy, may be outmoded, for vast wealth is
held in the form of personalty today.
A frequently recurring postmarital contract problem is a claim by
the wife against the husband or his estate for services rendered him dur-
ing coverture. The general contracts rule is that "where services are
rendered by one person for another, which are knowingly and voluntarily
accepted, without more, the law presumes that such services are given
and received in expectation of being paid for, and will imply a promise
to pay what they are reasonably worth." 8 But this presumption may be
rebutted by the relationship of certain parties in the absence of an express
or implied contract evidencing an intention to give and receive payment
for the services. 4 This presumption was first applied to the relationship
of husband and wife in North Carolina in Dorsett v. Dorsett." The court
recognized that "[i]t may be essential justice, in many cases, that where a
wife has rendered services outside the discharge of her household duties
that she should receive compensation . . . . -76 Nevertheless, it was held
that in the absence of an express or implied promise of the husband to pay
for such services, the wife could not recover for her services rendered to
her husband's business during the course of the marital relationship. A
slightly different situation was presented by Ritchie v. White." Plaintiff-
wife was expressly promised by her husband in his last years that he
would pay for "services in providing for his nursing, care and support,"78
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6(a) (1966) expressly requires that the contract be in
writing.
"Winkler v. Killian, 141 N.C. 575, 578, 54 S.E. 540, 541 (1906).
"'Avitt v. Smith, 120 N.C. 392, 27 S.E. 91 (1897). See also Note, 22 N.C.L.
REV. 53 (1943).
1 183 N.C. 354, 111 S.E. 541 (1922).
"Old. at 356, 111 S.E. at 542.
" 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
'I Id. at 452, 35 S.E.2d at 415.
[Vol. 47
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and she in fact did furnish all of his support and services. Recovery was
denied on all of the theories advanced by plaintiff-express contract, im-
plied assumpsit and quasi-contract-because of the marital relationship.
The court emphasized that neither spouse could have sued for specific
performance or for damages upon breach, seemingly contrasting a similar
agreement outside the marital relation. The decision evidenced a policy
of unwillingness to treat "domestic obligations incident to the marital
status" as subjects of commerce.7 Thus, contracts subjecting such mari-
tal duties to "barter and sale" treatment are said to be void because with-
out consideration." In the factual context of the Ritchie case the court
probably would have found sufficient consideration if the contract had been
between the decedent and a registered nurse who was not his wife. In-
stead of expressly basing the decision upon the salutary policy principles
enunciated, however, the court simply ruled that no consideration existed.
This example of the use of contractual language to express results of
decisions cannot be severely criticized because the decision has a real
foundation in the contractual principle of pre-existing legal duty. But
when the contract calls forth services outside the scope of the wife's usual
domestic obligations, there is no basis for denying the validity of con-
sideration sufficient to enforce a contract.
Domestic obligations that are not the proper subject of payment are
quite inclusive. Where the wife's agreement was to contribute assets from
her own estate and to furnish her labor in improving the homestead in
exchange for payment by the husband, she was denied recovery for per-
forming, in addition to her ordinary household duties, certain services
wherein she "worked tobacco, cut tobacco and helped make it, and made
rugs, and milked cows and sold milk .. ."81- The court conceded that
the performance of a contract requiring contributions from the separate
estate of the wife and her services beyond ordinary domestic duties is
valuable consideration but held that none of the wife's services were within
the terms of the required performance.
The courts' reluctance to enforce an inter-spousal agreement to pay
for services presents contracts law with theoretical problems. In Havig-
hurst's classical analysis of services in the home he said that "[ult is the
attempt to apply here rules that were developed for the commercial world
79 Id. at 454, 35 S.E.2d at 416.80Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
Sprinkle v. Ponder, 233 N.C. 312, 318, 64 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1951).
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that compels the courts to find many ways to minimize the effects of the
promise. ' 2 At least five such minimizing techniques are indicated: (1) the
Statute of Frauds and rules of evidence to vitiate the oral promise; (2)
the doctrine of failure of consideration; (3) undue influence; (4) the
doctrine that a conveyance cannot be fraudulent as against creditors; and
(5) the doctrine of moral consideration."8 It is apparent that the law of
contracts can be used to great advantage as an instrument of social policy
in the area of postmarital contracts for services, because the concepts
available permit the courts to do substantial justice by using contract
labels. Yet it is clear that courts do not regard a promise in a marital
context as the equivalent of a similar promise in a commercial context.
Several reasons have been advanced to explain the minor importance of
a spouse's promise in a marital context. The "mutual exchange of ser-
vices and support makes the benefit slight. There is doubtless a feeling
against commercializing the marriage relation. The law having provided
for the widow, a court is reluctant to increase her share of the husband's
estate at the expense of the children.
81 4
In the usual situation the wife is hindered in an attempt to collect
for her services, just as the husband is hindered in an attempt to deprive
his wife of property rights. The existence of bargain factors seems
equally important both in enforcing contracts for services outside the
scope of domestic duties and in enforcing contracts by which the property
of the wife is affected. In either situation the parties should be considered
"free traders" for the contracts to be enforced. When the contract is for
services to which the spouse is already entitled, however, bargain factors
theoretically must play no role because of the absence of a legal quid pro
quo. It is consistent with the foregoing analysis that the former contracts
are enforceable but the latter contract is not.
C. Separation Contracts
The question of enforceability or validity has long plagued separation
contracts in North Carolina. Following the lead of England and upholding
the common law fiction of the unity of husband and wife, the court de-
clared in 1867 that "[a]rticles of separation between husband and wife,
whether entered into before or after separation are against law and public
" Havighurst 395.
82 Id. at 395-96.
8" Id. at 397.
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policy, and therefore void."8 Not until 1912 was it finally decided that
the deed of separation was no longer void as a matter of law. 6 In Archbell
v. Archbell,s7 the court set forth certain conditions with which a separa-
tion agreement must comply. The separation must have already occurred
or must immediately follow the contract. The agreement, in other words,
must not look to a future separation. The parties not only must have
adequate reasons for the separation but also must reach an agreement fair
and just to the wife. This latter requirement is reflected in the protective
statute previously discussed.88 The certificate of the officer is deemed con-
clusive, except in cases of fraud, 9 that the agreement was fair and reason-
able to the wife.90 Although the statutory terms apply only to real estate
and income therefrom, the court has extended the statutory coverage by
requiring that separation agreements concerning the wife's right to support
and maintenance comply with the statutory safeguard of a private exam-
ination to determine that the agreement is not unreasonable or injurious
to her. 1 The rationale is that the wife's right to support is a property right
in this jurisdiction, which may be released by contract, the implication
being that such a property right is of sufficient value to deserve the pro-
tection afforded by the statute. The terms of a separation agreement must
be reduced to writing, to the extent that property interests are affected.
9 2
Thus, evidence of an oral promise of additional payments to the wife upon
a certain contingency was not admissible to vary the terms of a document
purporting to be a complete property settlement.
9 3
Separation agreements must withstand the usual tests of valid con-
tracts: contractual capacity in the parties, 4 unambiguous terms,"5 and an
objective meeting of the minds, evidenced by the signatures of the parties.9"
" Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. 153 (1867) (headnote). For a note tracing the
history of the separation contract in North Carolina see Note, 2 N.C.L. REv. 192
(1924).See Note, 2 N.C.L. REV. 192 (1924) and cases cited therein.
'7 158 N.C. 409, 74 S.E. 327 (1912).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1966).
" Tripp v. Tripp, 266 N.C. 378, 146 S.E.2d 507 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-6(b) (1966).
" Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506, 144 S.E.2d 603 (1965).
" Bolin v. Bolin, 246 N.C. 666, 99 S.E.2d 920 (1957).
" See Boone v. Boone. 217 N.C. 722, 9 S.E.2d 383 (1940) (oral agreement not
to maintain action tending to injure wife's reputation, held admissible).
98 Bost v. Bost, 234 N.C. 554, 67 S.E.2d 745 (1951).
"See Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); Lawson v.
Bennett, 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162 (1954).
"See Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
See Wade v. Wade, 252 N.C. 330, 113 S.E.2d 424 (1960).
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Unilateral mistake is insufficient to set the agreement aside.07 Except on
matters of custody and support for minor children, separation agreements
are binding and conclusive; they are completely determinative of the rights
and liabilities of the parties." Such agreements will not be modified or set
aside in regard to the division of property without the parties' consent,
absent mutual mistake or fraud. 0 But if the agreement is properly
executed in another jurisdiction without complying with the North Caro-
lina statute, the agreement may be attacked as unreasonable or injurious
to the wife, with the burden of proof placed upon the party asserting the
invalidity of the agreement.' 00 If the parties have complied with the
statute, adequacy of consideration is ordinarily not a basis for a subse-
quent challenge to the validity of the agreement; otherwise, the adequacy
of the consideration is a proper subject of inquiry.1 1 Consideration has
been found in forebearance to do certain acts,0 2 the promise to care for
a child, 103 and the mutual release of certain rights. 04
Separation agreements must be construed according to the rules usually
governing the interpretation of contracts. 0 5 The construction must effec-
tuate the intent of the parties, 06 which should be ascertained from the
"expressions used, the subject matter, the end in view, the purpose sought,
and the situation of the parties at the time.' ' 10 7 Extrinsic factors are not
permitted to modify contractual obligations under a marital settlement.'08
A separation agreement, however, does not rescind automatically an ante-
nuptial agreement'00 and, in accordance with ordinary rules of construc-
tion, the two agreements will be construed consistently if possible. As
stated in an earlier comparison with antenuptial agreements, separation
agreements are ordinarily annulled by the parties' subsequent resumption
with each other of conjugal cohabitation." 0 A subsequent separation does
" Cobb v. Cobb, 211 N.C. 146, 189 S.E. 479 (1937)."8Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).
" Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
... Davis v. Davis, 269 N.C. 120, 152 S.E.2d 306 (1967).
101 See Tripp. v. Tripp, 266 N.C. 378, 146 S.E.2d 507 (1966); Van Every v.
Every, 265 N.C. 506, 144 S.E.2d 603 (1965).
102 Church v. Hancock, 261 N.C. 764, 136 S.E.2d 81 (1964).
... Campbell v. Campbell, 234 N.C. 188, 66 S.E.2d 672 (1951)1' Blankenship v. Blankenship, 234 N.C. 162, 66 S.E.2d 680 (1951).
10' Church v. Hancock, 261 N.C. 764, 136 S.E.2d 81 (1964).
... Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E.2d 826 (1961).
1, Bowles v. Bowles, 237 N.C. 462, 465, 75 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1953).
... Church v. Hancock, 261 N.C. 764, 136 S.E.2d 81 (1964).
"o Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 89 S.E.2d 245 (1955).
... Hutchins v. Hutchins, 260 N.C. 628, 133 S.E.2d 459 (1963).
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not revive the agreement, but neither does the resumption of the marital
relationship upset executed provisions of the separation contract."' Recon-
ciliation such as to invalidate a separation agreement is a question of
fact,1 2 but the parties may agree orally to rescind a written agreement and
to execute a new one arising out of a reconciliation."' Neither subsequent
divorce 14 nor remarriage where the promise is to support the wife for
life' 1"5 relieves the husband of his obligation to support his wife unless
expressly provided otherwise in the separation agreement.
Problems of enforcement arise when separation agreements are made
part of a judgment. A subsequent consent judgment may supercede cer-
tain terms of the separation contract."' The courts have divided over
whether, once the agreement is incorporated into a consent judgment, it
is then enforceable by a contempt decree." 7 North Carolina has held Such
awards enforceable by contempt in the above context, and the amounts
awarded are not subject to modification without the consent of the
parties."' The separation agreement may not be used, however, as a
shield by the husband who breaches his promise to pay and then asserts
the separation agreement as a defense to an action for alimony. A choice
of remedies is given the wife in such a situation; she may sue for damages
for breach of contract or, if the breach is of an indispensable part of the
contract, she may seek alimony, effectually treating the contract as re-
scinded.""
The interpretation of separation contracts involves fewer variations
from contracts law than the court's treatment of any other marital con-
tracts. One reason is that the parties are no longer bound to each other
by the traditional marital relation of trust and confidence. Although the
statutory requirement of a private examination of the wife is necessary
to validate most separation agreements,2 legal theory suggests that the
"negotiation of a property settlement involves the same considerations
... Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E.2d 714 (1965).
112 Coulbourn v. Armstrong, 243 N.C. 663, 91 S.E.2d 912 (1956).
1.Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C. 630, 151 S.E.2d 592 (1966).
... Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 N.C. 715, 89 S.E.2d 417 (1955).
.5 Howland v. Stitzer, 240 N.C. 689, 84 S.E.2d 167 (1954).
. Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E.2d 826 (1961).
.For a discussion of the enforceability of consent judgments by contempt pro-
ceedings see Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1957).
"'Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956).
.. Wilson v. Wilson, 261 N.C. 40, 134 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
"0 See Bolin v. Bolin, 246 N.C. 666, 99 S.E.2d 920 (1957) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-6 (1966).
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as the negotiation of any other contract. Both husband and wife are of
age, supposedly in full possession of their faculties, and dealing at arm's
length."'' Thus, bargain factors seem to predominate, explaining the
court's tendency to treat separation contracts as commercial contracts are
treated. Whether the courts are properly interpreting separation contracts
has been questioned, however. The validity of the rationale that bargain
factors are predominant is indeed doubtful in view of the fact that "[t]he
bargaining power of the parties is affected by their relative desire for di-
vorce .... On a lower plane, such items as detective reports or compro-
mising photographs may be used as the quid pro quo for property.' 12 2
A degree of consistency in result is achieved by an analysis of the
three categories of contracts to which attention has been directed using
a combination of the three concepts delineated at the outset-the influence
of the statutes, the elements of bargain and the pervasiveness of public
policy. Marital contracts cases are commonly expressed in terms of con-
tractual concepts. Courts have rarely diverted from the usual course of
contractual language by stating results frankly in terms of the public
policy of the marital relation. Yet there are cases subject to analysis only
in terms of policies other than those usually surrounding the marital rela-
tion. For example, in Willard v. Hobby'23 plaintiff contracted to care for
her sick husband. Though a service to which the husband already was
entitled, and though the contract was with the wife's former employer (not
her husband) to enable her to obtain social security benefits, performance
of the services was held sufficient consideration for a valid contract not
against public policy. This result has been explained in terms of the cir-
cumstances involving the social security laws with the rule of construction
giving a claimant the benefit of the doubt. 124 In Kovler v. Vagenheint 12
plaintiff sued to recover on an antenuptial agreement that defendants
would indemnify him for expenses for the care and support of defendants'
pregnant sister if he would promise to marry her. Following a divorce,
which was contemplated in the agreement, plaintiff's action resulted in
a recovery based upon the validity of the agreement, consideration having
"' C. CLAD, FAMILY LAW 102 (1964).122 Id. at 103.
..3 134 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1955), noted in 7 MERCER L. REV. 383 (1956).
2' See Note, 7 MERcER L. REV. 383 (1956). The result is consistent with the
position that consideration exists, adopted by RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(d)
(1932).
125333 Mass. 252, 130 N.E.2d 557 (1955), noted in 11 MIAMI L.Q. 143 (1956).
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been found in his promise to marry. Though an agreement looking to a
future separation and absolving the hubsand of his duty of support, the
contract was upheld as not against public policy, probably because allevi-
ating the "financial burden of support does not facilitate divorce,"1 2 6 nor
is the desire to legitimize a child lightly regarded . 2
D. Contracts to Raise Children in a Particular Religion
Marital contracts to raise children in a particular religion are unique
in that courts and commentators generally disregard the contractual
aspects of the agreement and base enforcement vel non purely on public
policy.'28 The contract typically results from the desire of a Roman
Catholic to receive a special dispensation to marry a non-Catholic2 9 and
thus continue to receive the Sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church.
130
The non-Catholic usually agrees to raise any children of the marriage in
the Roman Catholic religion.'
The question of the enforceability of such agreements may arise in
several different settings. Divorce or separation may lead to litigation
concerning the custody of the children; the Catholic parent may die, and
the surviving spouse then break the agreement; or both parents may
die, and the agreement becomes relevant in determining custody.3 2 No
North Carolina case has been found dealing with this type of contract, but
other courts' decisions have been placed in six classifications. 3' (1) The
traditional English view was that father had the right to choose the religion
of his children.114 (2) Courts have enforced the contract on grounds of
consideration found in the irrevocable change in status on the part of the
Catholic. (3) Courts have denied enforcement of the contract but
18 Note, 11 MIAmI L.Q. 143, 145 (1956).
2
1 Id.
1' See Friedman, The Parental Right to Control The Religious Education of
a Child, 29 HARv. L. REv. 485 (1916); Gans, Enforceability of Antenuptial Agree-
ments Providing for. the Religious Education of Children, 1 J. FAm. L. 227 (1961)
and cases cited therein; Martin, Enforceability of Ante-Nuptial Promises to Raise
Children in a Particular Religion, 7 CATHOLIC LAW. 50 (1961); Note, Enforce-
ability of Antenuptial Contracts in Mixed Marriages, 50 YALE L.J. 1286 (1941).
1' See Gans, supra note 128, at 227; Martin, supra note 128, at 51.




1 2 Id. at 1290-91.
1.. The classification which follows is that of Martin. Martin, supra note 128, at
51-56 and cases cited therein.
1. Friedman, supra note 128, at 488.
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allowed the child to choose for himself which religion he shall follow.'
85
(4) Other courts have made the primary consideration the child's welfare
and awarded custody on that basis. Then the parent given custody of
the child may determine his religious training. (5) Some states have
viewed the question as a constitutional one. (6) The position adopted
by a few states is that the primary consideration is the welfare of the
children "but that a parent, having freely entered a serious agreement,
ought not to be allowed to breach it without good and substantial rea-
son.""' Other rationales that have been suggested are the availability
of legal and equitable remedies, estoppel, indefiniteness and impractical
enforceability of the agreement, and public policy concepts against inter-
vention in religious matters and enforcement of moral duties.13
Regardless of the position taken by individual writers as to the en-
forceability of marital contracts to raise children in a particular religion,
recognition of the very minor role of contracts law seems implicit. Even
an advocate of "enforceability," who relied heavily upon the agreement
between the parents in support of his position, cautioned that "wholly
doctrinaire approaches and artificial standards can but prove inade-
quate." s3 8 The implication seems clear that contractual concepts contribute
less toward an analysis of the enforceability of this type of marital con-
tract than of other antenuptial contracts or of postnuptial or separation
contracts. The ease with which results are explained with little emphasis
on contracts law highlights the genuine nature of the problem involved-
the public policy of the family. Marital contracts to raise children in a
particular religion present the clearest example of the courts' recognition
that the analysis of certain marital contracts falls outside the pale of
contracts law.
III. CONCLUSION
It has been said that in the interpretation of certain marital con-
tracts the "same rules and doctrines used in the commercial field [are]
made to yield acceptable results in a field that is concerned with vastly
different problems."' 89 The general acceptability of the results has been
...Yet this case, Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812 (1954), in-
volved a twelve year old and presumably did not deal with the more significant
question of control over the earlier years of a child, before he is able to make a
meaningful choice.
... Martin, supra note 128, at 56.
137 Gans, supra note 128, at. 227-28.
18 Martin, supra note 128, at 84.
... Havighurst 405-06.
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attributed to the flexibility of the contractual concepts used and the
ability of judges to recognize and deal with the nature of the prob-
lem involved. 140 This rationale is only partly sufficient, however. The
flexibility of contractual concepts has enabled the court to employ the
language of contracts law, but judges have not looked to contracts
rules and doctrines for acceptable results unless bargain factors exist.
Rather, they have applied standards far higher than those of the market
place in order to reach acceptable results. Then the results are expressed
in contractual terms.
The question posed at the outset, whether the law of contracts pro-
vides the most meaningful method available for the analysis and expression
of public policy of marital contracts reduces to a question of preference
as to expression but not as to analysis. One concerned with remaining
within the existing juridical concepts will prefer that results be expressed
in contractual terms, but one concerned with actual expression of the policy
rationale of the decision will prefer that results be expressed in explicit
policy terms, without the cloak of contractual language. The latter view
seems more appropriate, not only to keep judges intellectually honest and
acutely aware of the important familial policies involved, but also to guard
against the blurring of doctrinal lines, creating risks that faulty analysis
will lead to the application of marital contractual principles to commercial
contracts where application is inappropriate and vice versa. The analysis
of a marital contract, however, should not be left to preference at all.
Regardless of the language in which results are expressed, analytical con-
cepts that emphasize the status or relationship between the parties should
prevail over traditional contractual tests. Thus if the relationship of hus-
band and wife in regard to a particular transaction is the rare one in which
bargain factors predominate, commercial standards are sufficient. But if
the relationship is the usual one of trust and confidence-which must, after
all, be presumed-then standards no less stringent than those applied
to fiduciary relationships should govern. The North Carolina court's
decisions are consistent with this analysis now, and the standard seems
implicit. It is hoped that such a standard will become explicit.
THOMAS W. TAYLOR
140 Id. at 406.
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